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The Government of Malaysia has made continuous efforts and put in place an elaborate set of
strategies  and institutions aimed at  combating corruption  and promoting  integrity  in  the
society. The nation’s anti-corruption drive received a major boost in 2003 when Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi took over as Malaysia's fifth prime minister. Soon after its take over of power
the new government declared containing corruption as its main priority which was followed
by a series  of  concrete  measures.  However,  the governmental  attempts  and strategies  in
Malaysia  appear  to  have  met  with  little  success,  as  evidenced  by  the  current  data  that
suggests  entrenched corruption in the society.  Evidence shows that  despite  governmental
campaigns and initiatives, corruption has remained acute, widespread and, in fact, worsened
in recent years. This paper presents a critical overview of the anti-corruption strategies being
followed  in  Malaysia  and  explores  some  of  the  problems  and  limitations  of  the  current
approach to fighting corruption and managing integrity in the society.
1. Introduction
Although  corruption  is  not  a  new phenomenon,  lately  it  has  become a  matter  of
growing concern all over the world. This is partly because of the changing economic
and  political  environment  around  the  globe  and  partly  because  of  the  growing
consensus in both academic and policy circles of the negative impacts of corruption
on socio-economic development. Now there is a far greater appreciation than in the
past that corruption is not only morally wrong, it exacts a heavy toll on a nation’s
prosperity. Corruption undermines good governance, distorts public policy, leads to
misallocation  of  resources  and  hurts  economic  growth  (Bardhan,  1997;  Rose-
Ackerman,  1999).  Consequently  governments  and  international  agencies  have
diverted much efforts searching for effective measures to control this menace. This
has produced a variety of strategies and institutional innovations around the world. A
popular choice has been the establishment of a strong and centralized anti corruption
agency modeled along the lines of those in Singapore and Hong Kong with clear
mandates  to  confront  the  problems  of  corruption.  Elsewhere,  a  multiple  agency
framework has been adopted which involves creating and/or strengthening of anti-
corruption capacities across several governmental agencies (Meagher, 2005). But the
results  achieved  are  far  from  uniform:  while  some  countries  have  achieved
considerable success in containing corruption, others have failed to make significant
headways  despite  having  followed  similar  anti-corruption  reforms  and  strategies.
Attempts to draw lessons for policy transfers have proved difficult (Klitgaard, 1988;
Quah, 2003) given the differences in the contexts and a host of other factors. Thus
there is a general lack of agreement on what approaches work and what explains the
success and failure of anti corruption strategies. 
Notwithstanding this, combating corruption or promoting integrity has become
a  major  component  of  governmental  reforms  in  many  countries.  Malaysia  is  no
exception to  this  rule.  In  appreciation  of  the  significance  of  good governance  for
sustained economic growth and prosperity generally the Malaysian government has
renewed its commitment to fighting corruption. While the Anti Corruption Agency
was set up in 1967 with clear mandates, it was reformed and revitalized subsequently
to make it more effective in containing corruption and all forms of maladministration
in the society.  Since 2003 fighting corruption has been firmly on the agenda of the
government:  variety  of  new  initiatives  and  strategies  have  been  devised  and
implemented ever since. Taken together,  Malaysia has an elaborate anti-corruption
framework.  Yet  Malaysia  presents  an interesting case:  the level  of corruption  has
remained high and the plethora of strategies and the recent campaigns appear to have
made hardly any difference in containing and combating corruption in the society.
This  paper  presents  a  critical  overview  of  Malaysia’s  anti-corruption  strategies
highlighting some of their drawbacks and limitations. We begin with a brief review of
the literature on corruption and anti-corruption, which is followed by an overview of
institutional strategies and recent initiatives for combating corruption and managing
integrity in the society.  Section four  provides an analysis  of the inadequacies  and
limitations  of  the  current  approach  to  fighting  corruption  and  managing integrity.
Finally,  in the  concluding section of  the paper  we outline key lessons and policy
implications for bolstering the effectiveness of anti-corruption drives and strategies. 
2. Corruption and Anti-Corruption:  Conceptual Issues
Corruption is a complex phenomenon. Despite numerous attempts to define the term
there is hardly any single definition that is ‘sufficiently capacious yet discriminating
(Williams, 1999) to be accepted to universal satisfaction. Generally, it is defined as
‘the abuse of public power for private gains in violation of rules’ (Rose-Ackerman,
1999; Manion, 2004).  It  is also seen as ‘illegal  actions undertaken by government
officials to enrich themselves…’ (Geddes and Neto, 1999: 24).  Though quite popular,
this is often seen as a ‘narrow’, ‘legalist’ and ‘public-office centered’ definition of
corruption, for it does not take into account all forms of corruption. As opposed to the
view above, some scholars advanced what is known as ‘the market-centered’ view of
corruption.  They regard  corruption  when  a  civil  servant  perceives  his  office  as  a
business seeking to maximize his income from it (Tilman, 1968). There is yet another
perspective- ‘the public interest centered’ view about corruption. According to this
view corruption is a violation of public interests and it includes ‘actions which favor
whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to public and its interests’
(Friedlich,  1966). It  is obvious from the definitions above that corruption involves
actions on part of public officials that are regarded as improper and unlawful in which
they seek to promote private benefits at the expense of the public interests.  It is seen
as a deviant behavior associated with a specific motivation namely that of private
gains at public cost.
In this paper we adopt the UNDP’s definition of corruption as ‘the misuse of
public  power,  office  or  authority  for  private  benefit  through  bribery,  extortion,
influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement’ (UNDP, 1999:7).
Though this is not fundamentally different from the first and the third perspectives
above,  our  selection can be justified on at  least  two grounds.  First,  this relatively
narrower and specific meaning is most appropriate in the present context since the
paper  focuses  on  public  sector  corruption,  as  opposed  to  corruption  generally.
Secondly this definition captures both political as well as bureaucratic dimensions of
corruption  – believed to  be rampant  in most developing countries.  Thus we view
corruption as the illegitimate and unethical use of public authority for personal and
private advantage. It involves all kinds of behaviour on part of public officials when
they, in defiance of prescribed norms, act in a manner or deviate from the commonly
accepted  standards  of  rectitude  and  integrity  expected  of  them,  to  advance  their
personal interest at the expense of public interests. In  other words, any action that
distorts  normal  administrative  behaviour  is  tantamount  to  corruption.   Since  it
involves the abuse of official position for personal gains, it amounts to betrayal  of
public trust. Hence, all kinds of unethical acts like bribery, nepotism and favouritism,
patronage  distribution,  deviation  from  official  rules  and  regulations,  abuse  of
authority, fraud, extortion, misappropriation of funds and resources, partisan approach
in dealing with clients are obvious manifestations of corruption.  
Though in the present paper we use a narrower definition of corruption and
concentrate primarily on official corruption committed by political and administrative
elites, it does not necessarily mean that corruption is confined to government alone
and that the holders of public office are more corrupt than others. Defined in a broader
sense as the abuse of power, corruption implies a pattern of behaviour that can be
found in virtually every sphere of life. For that matter, it is an integral part of human
society. Available evidence indicates its presence in the political system, business and
corporate  sector,  NGOs  and  voluntary  organisations.   Although  often  corruption
involves  officials  holding  important  positions,  one  can  very  well  get  involved  in
corruption without holding office in public, private or voluntary organisations. Some
examples  of  corruption  which  do  not  necessarily  involve  public  officials  include
terrorism,  smuggling,  tax  evasion,  profiteering,  fraud  in  selling and  buying  lands,
defaulting of bank-loans, under and over-invoicing, currency manipulation, forgeries,
deceit, adulteration of food and medicine, money laundering, and ballot stuffing. 
Caiden (1981) distinguishes between corruption as a fact of life and corruption
as a way of life.  For him, in a country where cases of corruption are exceptions rather
than  rule,  then  the  corruption  is  a  fact  of  life.  But  if  corruption  is  rampant  and
becomes the norm rather than exception then corruption is a way of life. Others draw
a distinction between grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand corruption refers
to corruption by political leaders and senior bureaucrats and normally involves large
amounts.  Petty  corruption,  on the other  hand,  is  practiced by junior  officials  who
demand bribes to task and render services (Stapenhurst and Langseth, 1997). Morally,
all forms of corruption are wrong and they have a damaging effect on the society at
large. Therefore an effective anti-corruption strategy should be able to contain both
grand and petty corruption simultaneously.  While there is an apparent consensus on
this point, this is hardly the case with the causes and remedies of corruption. In fact,
the scholars have not been able to isolate and agree on all antecedents of corruption.
This has led to the divergence in suggested remedies which include legal, economic,
socio-cultural, and political measures1 to combat and contain it (see, Huberts, 1998).
A caveat must be noted here. Despite such identifications, the various approaches are
not stand alone sets of options, there is a great  deal of overlap and in reality they
complement  each  other.  Thus  most  analysts  advocate  an  integrated  approach  to
dealing with corruption. For example, what Rose-Ackerman (1999) has proposed can
be  described  as  legal  and  economic  approach  which  involves,  among  others,
increasing the risks and costs of corruption while reducing incentives for  payoffs,
discretion  and  bargaining  power  of  officials.   On the  other  hand,  what  Klitgaard
suggests  is  essentially  a  management  approach  to  controlling  corruption  that  has
economic, political and administrative dimensions. For Klitgaard, corruption thrives
when individuals and organisations have monopoly over a good or service, discretion
over decision making and limited or no accountability (Klitgaard, 1998). Therefore,
by implication it means that the government that wishes to combat corruption should
curb monopolies, limit discretion and institute democratic and transparent processes
to enhance accountability. 
While  the  value  of  above  approaches  is  hardly  contested,  in  recent  years
leading international organizations like Transparency International (TI) and the World
Bank have placed emphasis on development of the national integrity system as an
effective strategy for containing corruption. To a large measure, the national integrity
system combines the key elements of the various approaches  discussed above.  A
strong and effective national integrity system makes corruption a high risk and low
return activity.   The most distinctive feature of national  integrity system is that it
seeks to prevent corruption from occurring in the first place rather than investigating
and punishing the offenders. Although there are variations across nations Stapenhurst
and Langseth (1997) have identified some of the key pillars of the national integrity
system.  These  include  public  sector  anti-corruption  strategies,  watchdog  agencies,
public  participation  in  democratic  process,  public  awareness  and  the  role  of  civil
society groups, accountability of the judicial process, the media, the private sector and
international cooperation (in this paper our discussions will mostly focus on the first
two of these pillars). It is argued that these pillars are interdependent on one another
and hence it is important to ensure coherence and balance among them for greater
effectiveness of anti-corruption drives.  It must be noted that institutions are necessary
but they are by no means sufficient for effectively curbing corruption and enhancing
integrity.  The  effectiveness  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  political  will  of  the
government in combating it, level of governance and the nature of its policy context.
While  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong  have  been  highly  successful  because  of  their
government’s  strong  commitment  to  fighting  corruption  supported  by  effective
governance  and  favorable  policy  context,  anti-corruption  efforts  in  many  other
countries  of  the  region  have  failed  to  produce  desired  results  and,  in  fact,  faced
numerous obstacles given the absence of such critical factors (Quah, 2003).
3. Pillars of Public Integrity in Malaysia: Key Institutions & Strategies
With the aim of controlling corruption and promoting good governance the Malaysian
government has put in place an elaborate set of mechanisms and strategies. Though
major institutions like Anti-Corruption Agency have been there since late 1960s the
recent  years  have  seen  further  efforts  aimed  at  building  and  strengthening  anti-
corruption infrastructure. Currently Malaysia has an elaborate framework for dealing
with corruption and issues  of integrity.  In  this section we present  an overview of
major institutions and measures  that  form the key components of Malaysia’s  anti-
corruption strategies:  
Anti Corruption Agency (ACA)
The most important and powerful institutional mechanism for fighting corruption in
Malaysia  is  the Anti  Corruption Agency (ACA). Established in  1967 the ACA is
entrusted  with the  responsibility  to  prevent  and  eradicate  all  forms  of  corruption,
misuse of power and maladministration from the society.  Under the Anti Corruption
Act, 1997 (which replaced the original Prevention of Corruption Act, 1961) the ACA
is authorized to investigate, interrogate, arrest and prosecute offenders (GOM, 1997).
It has also been given powers to access documents and witnesses, freeze assets and
seize passports etc, monitor income and assets, and propose administrative and legal
reforms.  Since  its  establishment  the  ACA has  adopted a  comprehensive  approach
where a myriad of tools and strategies are applied. Three key components of ACA’s
strategy are education, prevention and enforcement. The education strategy focuses on
efforts to inculcate ethical values among members of the public and the civil service
so as to create a sense of abhorrence and intolerance towards corruption. Increasing
emphasis is placed on building rapport with the community and enlisting their support
in the fight against corruption. To this end, besides educating younger generations at
schools  and  other  educational  institutions  aimed  at  inculcating  noble  and  ethical
values among them, the ACA conducts dialogues, public campaigns and seminars to
explain anti-bribery laws, and encourage the community to take corruption prevention
measures and come forward to report to ACA on corruption cases.  Since prevention
is seen as a major strategy to combat corruption, the ACA has been active in the area
of tightening laws and procedures, with a view to enhancing the deterrence of its anti-
corruption  measures.  Thus  ACA  efforts  also  include  identification  of  areas  of
government activity  that are most prone to corruption and making recommendations
to  relevant  agencies  for  review  and  reforms  so  as  to  eliminate  loopholes  in  the
systems  and  procedures.  Alongside  this  ACA also  strives  to  confront  and  punish
corrupt elements  in the society through investigation and prosecution. It undertakes
investigation based on information received from the members of the public and other
sources. 
Table 1: Statistics on ACA Activities, 2000-2005
Year No.  of  cases
reported
No.  of  cases
investigated
No.  of  arrests
made
No.  of  cases
charged
2000 10736 699 431 160
2001 9039 663 318 115
2002 8298 1063 290 200
2003 9721 1058 339 175
2004 11413 982 497 178











Source:  Anti Corruption Agency
The large number of corruption cases received by the ACA annually indicates
the extent of the problem and the importance of the ACA in the eyes of the people.
Although the ACA refers many cases to relevant departments, yet available evidence
shows that it has been able to investigate and prosecute growing number of cases in
recent  years.   Table  1  shows  that  during  the  period  of  2000-2005  the  ACA has
received close to 10000 corruption cases annually. It has investigated roughly 1000
corruption cases each year.  It has also made nearly 400 arrests per year - many of
them were charged in courts and convicted. While much of the ACA’s current work is
concerned with the public service it  has also taken steps to investigate politicians,
businessmen and local government officials.
Public Complaints Bureau (PCB)
The  Public  Complaints  Bureau  (PCB)  is  responsible  to  receive  and  investigate
complaints arising from public dissatisfaction with government administration. It  is
required to report the outcome of its investigation with recommendations to a high-
powered Permanent  Committee on Public Complaints (PCPC) 2 and other  relevant
authorities. It is also to forward the decisions of the PCPC to ministries, federal and
state departments, statutory boards, local authorities and agencies concerned for the
purpose of corrective actions and monitor those actions. Established in 1971 the PCB
is considered as the focal point for the public to forward their complaints and seek
redress  on  any  alleged  administrative  lapses  and  abuse  in  dealing  with  public
bureaucracy.  The  PCB  is  authorised  to  receive  and  deal  with  public  complaints
against civil service on matters that are unjust, not in accordance with existing laws,
abuse  of  power  and  maladministration.  Public  complaints  include  all  aspects  of
government except those relating to government policies and matters that are within
the ambit of ACA, Special Cabinet Committee on Management of Public Integrity
(SCCMPI), and the Public Accounts Committee. Data obtained from the PCB shows
that in 2002, 2003 and 2004 the PCB has received 3238, 3174, and 2769 complaints
respectively (PCB, annual reports). However, the effectiveness of the PCB is open to
question given that it lacks any executive power: it suffers from insufficient authority
to  take  actions  against  errant  officials.   The  PCB can  only investigate  cases  and
forward its report to PCPC for further deliberations and decisions on recovery actions.
Nonetheless,  mere  existence  of  the  PCB  is  said  to  provide  a  passive  check  on
administration (Siddiquee, 2005).
Other Mechanisms & Strategies
Alongside the ACA and PCB a range of other traditional administrative and judicial
institutions like the Auditor General’s  Office,  Public Accounts Committee,  Police,
Attorney  General’s  Office,  Customs  and  Malaysian  Administrative  Modernisation
and Mangement Planning Unit (MAMPU)3 have also been given important roles in
containing  corruption  and  enhancing  integrity  in  the  society.  The  agencies  that
address  the concerns  of  integrity in the private sector  are Bank Negara  Malaysia,
Securities Commission, Barsa Malaysia, Companies Commission, Ministry of Trade
and  Consumer  Affairs.  Besides  such  regulatory  agencies,  the  recently  established
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and Business Ethics Institute of
Malaysia  (BEIM)  are  also  expected  to  play  significant  part  in  promoting  good
governance and ethics in the private sector. 
An  important  feature  of  public  sector  anti-corruption  strategy  is  the
establishment of Integrity Management Committees (IMC) at various levels of the
government.  At the highest level the SCCMPI chaired by the Prime Minister oversees
the overall management of public integrity.  The fact that the SCCMPI has recently
been restructured making the Prime Minister its chair (in stead of DPM) reflects a
renewed focus on integrity at the highest level  of the government.  There is also a
Parliamentary  Select  Committee  on  Integrity.  While  ministers  chair  similar
committees  at  the  ministry level,  there  are  also IMCs at  state  and  local  (district)
levels.  Such committees are required to meet at least once in every three months and
report to the IMC at next higher levels.  The IMC–reports of all ministries and state
governments are submitted to the ACA which tables such reports to the SCCMPI.
Thus  there  is  an  elaborate  institutional  arrangement  right  from the  district  to  the
highest levels of the government and this is to ensure that fight against corruption is
taken seriously at all levels and has the support of all those involved.  
Malaysia has also seen sustained efforts being made since the early 1980s to
inculcate positive values and work ethics among public officials through a variety of
measures.   Leadership  by  Example  (1983),  Name  Tags  (1985),  Assimilation  of
Islamic  Values  (1985),  Clean,  Efficient  and  Trustworthy Government  (1989),  and
Excellent Work Culture (1989) are among the important initiatives that were expected
to  inculcate  positive  values  thereby  support  government’s  anti-corruption  goals.
Likewise,  Quality  Control  Circles,  Total  Quality  Management,  ISO  9000  series,
Clients Charter, and Benchmarking were expected to have significant impact on the
quality  of  governance.  Currently  e-government  is  a  leading  component  of
government’s drive towards containing corruption in the public service.  Given that
clients are now able to complete transactions with government electronically without
having to visit the office/ meet the officials concerned it is also expected to eliminate
scopes for corruption to a large extent.  
Developments since 2003
Since 2003 corruption has become a central issue in Malaysia’s political discourse.
Soon after his takeover of power, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi declared
fighting corruption as his first priority. This was followed by a series of initiatives –
believed  to  be  an  integral  part  of  government’s  anti-corruption  campaign.  The
introduction of National Integrity Plan in 2004 represents a major effort made by his
government  towards  promoting  a  culture  of  integrity.  The  NIP  provides  a
comprehensive framework for promoting ethics and integrity in the society. Geared
towards instilling and nurturing an ethical culture and integrity at all levels of the
Malaysian society the NIP is expected to focus on individuals, family, private sector,
public administration, socio-cultural agencies, NGOs and politicians (GOM, 2004). 
The Malaysian Institute of Integrity (MII) was established in order to provide
a framework that  would support  the effective  coordination and implementation of
NIP. Chaired by the Chief Secretary to the government and governed by a Board of
Directors the MII is responsible for monitoring and coordinating the implementation
of  NIP.  The  MII  is  also  responsible  for  devising  appropriate  indices  to  measure
performance  in  achieving  NIP  targets,  preparing  annual  reports  on  Malaysian
Integrity  system and in  organizing conventions  of  stakeholders  to debate  integrity
issues seeking new and innovative ways to move forward. As a further effort aimed at
strengthening anti-corruption drives the Badawi government later established the Anti
Corruption Academy.  First of its kind in the region the Academy is seen as a regional
centre for anti corruption which will train officials from ACA and their counterparts
from other countries in the Asia-Pacific.  Thus the newly established Anti Corruption
Academy is expected to contribute to anti corruption capacity building in the region
and  promote  best  practices  and  tools  in  corruption  investigation,  monitoring  and
enforcement. In 2004 the Abdullah government introduced another scheme designed
to complement the ongoing efforts for enhancing public integrity in Malaysia. Known
as Islam Hadari (civilisational Islam) it is a comprehensive framework which seeks to
promote an integrated and balanced development, consistent with the tenets of Islam.
It  is  essentially  a  state-sanctioned  program  of  social  engineering;  it  emphasizes,
among others, the development of knowledgeable and pious people who are honest,
trustworthy and are prepared to take on global challenges.  Faith and piety in God, a
vigorous  pursuit  and  mastery  of  knowledge,  a  just  and  trustworthy  government,
cultural and moral integrity are among the leading principles of Islam Hadari (JKIM,
2005). Such principles are expected to guide the individuals as well as organizations
thus providing a framework for the formulation of  policies and strategies  towards
good governance and responsible administration. 
The most recent and perhaps the most significant  step in this regard is the
establishment of the Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission (MACC). Just months
before he handed over power to his deputy Prime Minister Badawi announced far
reaching reforms to the ACA transforming it into a full-fledged MACC modeled on
Hong Kong’s ICAC. In December, 2008 the Parliament has approved the MACC bill
which has also paved the way for the establishment of an independent advisory board,
a  parliamentary  committee,  a  complaints  committee  and  two  other  panels  -all
responsible for scrutinizing and advising MACC. Headed by the Chief Commissioner
the MACC will report to the Special Parliamentary Committee on Corruption. The
Committee will examine the report on the discharge of ACA functions and submit its
report to the PM who, in turn, would table it to the parliament. The newly constituted
MACC has thus far received mixed reactions.   Those in the opposition have been
highly critical of the MACC for it lacks independence and prosecutory powers and it
is effectively under the control of the executive. But those in the government have
maintained that the MACC having greater power, autonomy and accountability will
be more effective in tackling corruption than its predecessor ACA (The New Straits
Times, 11 December, 2008).
It  is  obvious that  Malaysia  has  put  in  place  comprehensive anti-corruption
strategies involving institutional, legal  and normative aspects. These strategies also
combine preventive as well as punitive dimensions. Taken together with watchdog
bodies,  educational  and social  awareness  programs and administrative innovations,
Malaysia provides an elaborate framework for dealing with corruption and issues of
public integrity. The obvious question is: how effective are such drives and strategies?
The governmental  attempts  and  strategies  in  Malaysia  have met  with little
success, as evidenced by the current data that suggests entrenched corruption in the
society.   Evidence shows that despite the campaign corruption has remained acute,
widespread and, in fact, worsened in recent years. In a recent survey conducted by
Transparency International the respondents have argued that little improvements have
had occurred in the fight against corruption.  Nearly two-thirds of the respondents
from the members of the public believed that there have been no improvements in the
levels  of integrity and transparency in both public  and private sectors.  A separate
survey on corporate managers revealed that some 47% paid or knew someone who
paid bribes in the past 12 months (International Herald Tribune, 5 March, 2007). The
police was  ranked  as the most corrupt  department  followed by other  enforcement
agencies  such  as  roads  and  transport  and  customs department.  The  magnitude  of
corruption in the enforcement agencies is evident from the confession of a former
police chief who revealed that 40% of the senior police officers could be arrested
without investigation – strictly on the basis on their lifestyles (Aliran Monthly, 11,
2007). The royal commission on police formed earlier by the government also made
similar observations about the magnitude of corruption within the agency.
The Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) has conducted a comprehensive
nation-wide survey in 2003 to study public perception about corruption. The study
gathered  information from cross-section of Malaysians including citizens, public and
private  sector  officials,  students,  political  parties  and  NGOs;  14.5%  of  the  7594
respondents surveyed admitted having paid bribe during the past 2 years, 19.5% had
witnessed bribe taking.  While the study found that corruption was more evident in
the political parties with 46% of those reporting the occurrence, corruption within the
government agencies was also found to be fairly high with 31.6% reporting it within
their own agencies.  The study identified enforcement,  administration,  finance and
audit, licensing and transport departments where corruption occurred more frequently4
(ACA, 2003).  
Data  released  by  Transparency  International  (TI)  shows  that  corruption
situation in  Malaysia  has  deteriorated  in  recent  years.   Table  2  shows  that  while
Malaysia was in 23rd position in 1995 when Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was
first introduced, it slipped to 36 in 2000 and to 44 in 2006. Although it recorded a
slight improvement in 2007 with 43rd position, in the most recently released ranking
Malaysia has slipped further and now finds itself in 47th position. It must be noted that
although  CPI  measures  perception  of  corruption  rather  than  actual  incidence  for
which it  is criticised – it  is  widely regarded as a useful  and reliable indication of
corruption situation in a particular country. In this case, the CPI ranking is significant
for it shows Malaysia’s position  vis-à-vis other countries especially its competitors.
Obviously a more significant indicator of Malaysia’s corruption scenario would be
CPI score which shows that the corruption situation has hardly improved over the past
decade.  
Table 2: Malaysia’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 1995-2008
Year CPI Score (out of 10) Overall Rank No. of countries assessed
1995 5.28 23 41
1996 5.32 26 54
1997 5.01 32 52
1998 5.30 29 85
1999 5.10 32 99
2000 4.80 36 90
2001 5.00 36 91
2002 4.90 33 102
2003 5.20 37 133
2004 5.00 39 146
2005 5.10 39 159
2006 5.00 44 163
2007 5.10 43 180
2008 5.10 47 180
Source: Data from Transparency International, Various Issues
As table shows, Malaysia’s recent CPI scores (eg. 5.0 in 2006 and 5.1 in 2007and
2008) remain far below the initial scores of 5.28 and 5.32 recorded in 1995 and 1996
respectively.  Clearly,  this  indicates  worsening  situation  despite  the  government’s
much  publicised  war  against  corruption  and  variety  of  measures  introduced  to
promote ethical behaviour in the society.  It may be noted here that at its launch, the
NIP has set the target to improve Malaysia’s CPI score to 6.5 and ranking to 30th by
2008 (from 37th in 2003).   The architects of  NIP  would be dismayed to find that
instead of improving the CPI  ranking has since then been falling and at the end of the
five  year  period  it  has  recorded  its  worst  performance  in  a  decade.  Clearly,  the
introduction of NIP and the other measures has failed to have any positive impact on
corruption. What explains such failures of anti-corruption strategies and drives? We
turn to this in the next section.
4. Explaining the Results:  Limitations of the Anti-Corruption Strategies 
When Abdullah Badawi succeeded Dr Mahathir Mohamad as the fifth Prime Minister
in  2003 fighting  endemic  corruption  and/or  promoting  integrity  was  his  platform
which propelled him to a landslide victory in general elections in the following year.
The  early  years  of  Abdullah  saw  serious  campaigns  which  led  to  arrests  and
convictions  of  some high  profile  individuals.  Although the drive has  continued it
appears to have lost force subsequently giving rise to suspicion about the seriousness
of the regime. It is important to note that Badawi’s tenure has been rocked by more
serious and growing allegations or corruption.  While the leadership continued to talk
tough  about  corruption  the  number  of  high  profile  catches  and  convictions  made
during the five years  of campaign do not match with such slogans.  Governmental
response  to  serious  corruption  scandals  involving  the  senior  leaders  of  the  ruling
Barisan Nasional (BN) deepened public suspicion about the seriousness of the drive.
Although  a  sitting  minister  was  arrested  before  the  elections,  following  election
results  when Abdullah  formed  the  new  Cabinet  he  retained  four  senior  ministers
against  whom there  were  strong allegations  of  corruption  (Case,  2005).   Lim Kit
Siang, a leader of political opposition and analyst  maintained: ‘if integrity and the
perception of integrity are among the indispensable criteria for selection of cabinet
ministers, the first Abdullah Cabinet has failed the acid test’ (Quoted in Malaysiakini,
2004). 
Another reason for the growing suspicion and the failure of the campaign is
the inability or unwillingness of the regime to tackle political corruption – believed to
be widespread in Malaysia.  The decades  of hegemonic rule by the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO), weak opposition and the absence of adequate checks
and balances have contributed to a culture characterised by ‘corruption, cronyism and
patronage’ (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).  The governing UMNO itself is a patronage-
driven party where leaders have long relied on easy access to government contracts
and patronage to secure political support (Teh, 2002; The Straits Times, 9 Oct, 2008).
It has strong ties with corporate sector and the leaders have used their positions to
advance their business interests and to distribute rents to select businesses (Gomez,
2005).  Although  the  most  recent  elections  have  seen  the  opposition  denying  the
government its two- thirds majority in the parliament for the first time in country’s
history,  the  political  culture  of  corruption,  cronyism  and  patronage  has  remained
unaltered. Likewise, the problem of ‘money politics’ is widespread (see Teh, 2002 for
all  its  manifestations),  though fingers  are often pointed to the ruling UMNO. It  is
alleged that UMNO officials including those in the highest echelons of the party and
government are involved in vote buying, and buying officials positions (Leong, 2006).
They  are  also  alleged  to  be  involved  in  new  forms  of  money  politics  where
competition  is  eliminated  through  buying  off  the  prospective  opponents  and  their
supporters  (Aliran Monthly, 13May,  2008).   Despite all claims, there is  very little
evidence to suggest that the senior party leaders within UMNO (the Isa Samad case
being an exception) have been confronted for their  alleged involvement in money
politics and other forms of corruption. It is now clear that the leadership was either
unable or unwilling to upset the vested political and business interests closely linked
to UMNO whose support is crucial for preserving and perpetuating its power.  
Despite poor CPI ranking in Indonesia, country’s newly established apex body
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has mounted a serious and robust anti-
corruption  campaign  and  arrested  and  prosecuted  growing  number  of  powerful
officials. In Malaysia the governmental response has remained lukewarm especially
when prominent individuals within the government are involved. Some recent events
may help illustrate the situation. When allegations of corruption involving some key
figures like the Internal Security Deputy Minister, the Director General of the ACA,
the Chief Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak, Inspector General of Police, judges, and
the Chief  of  the Commercial  Investigation Department  became widely known, the
government  failed  to  act  in  a  decisive  manner.  Governmental  response  to  such
allegations came to be dubbed as ‘too little, too late and too lax’ (Guan Eng, 2007). It
is interesting to note that in this particular case the government has allowed the parties
involved in corruption to investigate each other.  The police investigated the ACA
chief and the ACA investigated the Internal Security Deputy Minister and the Police
Chief. The entire process ended in fiasco when the Attorney General decided that all
three were clean (Aliran Monthly, 11, 2007)! This came as a surprise to independent
observers,  analysts  and political  activists  who were  left  with  more questions  than
answers about the seriousness of the probe and the commitment of the government to
punish the offence. Some of them labelled government’s anti-corruption campaign as
‘full of sound and fury signifying nothing’ (Lim, 2008). Such views may appear too
extreme but it is hard to dismiss them altogether as simply politically motivated.  
In fairness, it must be said that the Badawi government has mounted a more
serious campaign against corruption than previously which led to greater activism on
part  of  relevant  agencies.  Yet,  the  above  events  explain why the  sincerity  of  the
leadership has remained a suspect – especially to the political opposition, civic groups
and independent observers. Even the public at large has remained unconvinced that
enough  has  been  done  either  to  contain  high  profile  corruption  or  to  bolster
accountability  and  transparency  in  administration.   Despite  the  reformist  policy
announcements  made by the leadership not much has really changed in the broad
governance  context.  Few  practical  steps  were  made  to  address  the  limitations  of
crucial institutions and to make them truly strong, independent and effective. One of
the frequent criticisms of Malaysia’s anti-corruption strategy has been that even the
most powerful ACA is toothless in respect of high profile corruption cases. It is often
alleged that the ACA is busy catching small fries but doing very little or nothing to
‘whales’  in  political,  business and administrative circles  (Siddiquee,  2005;  Leong,
2006). This is no exaggeration for bulk of the corruption cases investigated and acted
upon by the ACA involved lower level officials - despite allegations of corruption
involving political and administrative elites are rampant. Of 485 arrests made by ACA
for  corruption  in  2004 there  was  only one  influential  figure  (Rosnah,  2008).  The
meagre number of arrests made from such groups lends credence to the view that
ACA finds lower level officials an easy target as they have neither the strength nor the
political clout to escape punishments.  
Though Hong Kong and Singapore have followed similar models where anti-
corruption  agency  remains  accountable  to  the  head  of  the  government  producing
exemplary  results5,  in  Malaysia  such  an  arrangement  appears  to  be  part  of  the
problem.  The  institutional  location  of  the  ACA  under  the  Prime  Minister’s
Department and its subordination to political office was often seen as an impediment
to its task of vigilance (Ho, 1999; Siddiquee, 2005). Evidence suggests that instead of
acting as independent agency the ACA remained beholden of the wishes of the Prime
Minister’s  Department.  There  were  allegations  that  the  ACA  was  extraordinarily
efficient acting against those in opposition but either reluctant or terribly incompetent
in cases where the people from the ruling BN are involved. The infamous Lingam
videotape serves as an example of how the ACA allows itself to be perceived as a tool
of the government.  The widely known videotape - made public by two opposition
leaders  -  shows a conversation where appointments of judges  were  brokered by a
senior lawyer  and the judge seeking help for the top job.  Instead of pursuing the
offenders in the video the ACA had threatened to jail the two opposition leaders if
they  failed  to  surrender  the  whistle  blowers  behind  the  video-tape.  This  event  is
significant for not that it shows corruption within the judiciary, but the ACA’s mis-
handling of the case and the resultant dangers being faced by whistle blowers in the
current context.  Given that Malaysia lacks, among others, whistle blower protection
laws and the freedom of information acts, very few would dare to face the odds. In
other words, it is likely that cases of corruption and unethical conducts of this sort will
go unreported. 
The most recent reform that has transformed ACA into MACC has certainly
enhanced its status and powers.  Our judgement on its roles and effectiveness must
await  some  time  for  the  agency  has  been  in  operation  for  a  few  months  only.
Meanwhile, it appears to have embroiled itself in a series of controversies including
the case of  torture  and tragic  death of  an opposition lawmaker’s  personal  aide in
MACC  headquarters  (The  Straits  Times,  20,  2009).  Although  the  PCB  offers  a
convenient and useful channel for the citizens to lodge complaints, it is an adjunct of
the Prime Minister’s  Office  and it  lacks  power  to  enforce  decisions.  Perhaps this
explains why the number of complaints lodged (3000-4000) is not large relative to the
population  and  the  context  where  perception  and  allegations  of  corruption  are
widespread.  
Some  other  limitations  of  the  current  approach  must  be  noted.  Malaysia
presents a case where some of the basic conditions of good governance like access to
information, accountability and transparency in public administration and independent
media are either absent or very weak.  Despite talks about good governance Malaysia
not  only maintains  tight  state  controls  on media  but  the Official  Secrets  Act  that
restricts information access and disclosure remain firmly in place. This, along with
various other coercive legislations and restrictions on the press and civic groups have
greatly undermined the media’s prospect and suppressed public opinion as a force in
checking official excesses. Neither the media nor the whistle-blowers, interest groups,
political activists are able to present government documents as evidence of corruption
and  malfeasance  as  they  risk  severe  penalties  under  such  legislations.  They  are
handicapped further by the absence of transparency in public decision making. While
transparency  is  given  lip-service  there  is  evidence  that  much  of  governmental
business is done in non-transparent manner, resources are allocated based on political
and other non-economic criteria, and tenders are awarded to chosen parties without
competitive bidding. Development projects and contracts continue to be promised and
awarded to party loyalists and other closely connected groups. The way privatisation
programs  and  public  procurement  is  conducted  in  Malaysia  leaves  scopes  for
corruption.  The  process  followed  is  anything  but  transparent.  The  Malaysian
experience of privatisation shows that in most cases projects were awarded based on
private  discussions  between  top  politicians,  their  allies  and  select  businesses  (see
Gomez,  2005).  Despite  very  many  reforms  little  has  changed  in  such  practices.
Needless to say that such policies and practices are hardly consistent with goals of
integrity and values of good governance.  It is in this sense that the current reforms
and strategies are inherently incomplete.  
Reforms initiated and strategies  adopted are also incomplete for  they have
failed to address some root causes of corruption. It  is widely believed that, among
others, politicisation of bureaucracy and the ethnic factor in politics and public policy
have much to do with the present levels of corruption. The politically neutral public
service that Malaysia had inherited from its colonial masters has become increasingly
politicised  since  independence  (Navaratnam,  1984;  Hai,  2002).  Theoretically  the
Malaysian bureaucrats continue to subscribe to the principle of political neutrality,
however  in  practice  there  is  considerable  evidence  to  suggest  that  they are  either
actively involved  in  politics  or  often partisan  in  their  approaches.  Several  factors
explain  this.  Members  of  senior  bureaucracy  in  Malaysia  are  almost  exclusively
drawn from ethnic Malays (see Hai, 2003); they also share the same socio-economic
background with political leaders.  This allows them to develop intimate and mutually
supportive  relationship  with  political  elites.  At  times,  they  are  under  pressure  to
identify themselves with the goals, ideologies and policies of the ruling party. Also,
the senior party leaders within the governing UMNO have publicly abhorred the idea
of political neutrality and supported the active role of public servants. Given this, the
law that prohibits the civil servants from being involved in party politics is enforced
rarely  and  selectively  (Crouch,  1996).  More  importantly,  the  ruling  UMNO  has
always  used civil  service as  a recruiting ground.  Such policies  and practices  have
encouraged many senior officials especially those who wish to build career in politics
– to become passive members of the ruling party/coalition. Consequently the fine line
that separates politics from professional administration has become blurred. One of
the consequences of such a phenomenon is the enhanced bureaucratic discretion and
weak  political  control  –  referred  to  as  ministerial  slack  and  indulgence  (for  an
extended account, see Hai, 2002). Given their close relationships with civil servants,
political  leaders  have  at  times  failed  to  enforce  strict  bureaucratic  accountability.
Therefore, corruption in the public service must not be viewed in isolation from such
developments.
The other notable feature that largely explains the widespread corruption is the
ethnic  dimension  of  public  policy  and  political  patronage.   In  Malaysia’s  plural
society although the ethnic Malays are the majority and they hold the key positions in
government,  historically  they have  been  backward  in  economic  terms.   The  New
Economic Policy (NEP) adopted in the aftermath of the race riot in 1969 aimed at
ensuring equitable distribution of corporate equity between  Bumiputera Malays and
the predominantly Chinese  non-Bumiputeras institutionalised affirmative  action by
introducing Bumiputera quota in government contracts, licenses, and loans.  The NEP
also required the companies to restructure their corporate holdings to ensure at least
30%  Bumiputera ownership.   Such  a  strategy  in  place  since  the  early  1970s  is
generally seen to be successful in raising Bumiputera share (Gomez, 2005), but it also
became associated with corruption, nepotism and cronyism. Under the NEP the public
sector saw a massive expansion creating opportunities for the  Malay politicians and
bureaucrats in charge to engage in corruption and patronage distribution (see Crouch,
1996, for details). 
New policies like privatisation and liberalisation of the economy introduced
later since mid-1980s have opened up further opportunities for patronage distribution.
A notable feature of the NEP is that it has led to the emergence of new ways of doing
business.  To  comply  with  NEP  requirements  many  Chinese  owners  incorporated
influential  Malays in their businesses thus forming what has come to be known as
‘Ali-Baba alliance’.  Ali- the Malay partner remained less active contributing only in
terms of his influence and connections.   Baba - the Chinese partner does the actual
work contributing his capital, skills, know-how and time. This sort of partnerships
gave the Chinese access to licenses and lucrative government contracts reserved for
Bumiputeras. The Malay partner benefitted by accepting fees and profits in return for
his name being used.  Thus the ethnic policy has fostered and helped to sustain new
forms  of  corruption.  Given  that  this  served  as  useful  mechanisms  for  securing
political support for the ruling elites consolidating their hold on power, hardly any
serious drive was mounted to tackle such practices. 
The  new  policies  adopted  since  the  end  of  NEP  period  did  not  seek  to
dismantle the ethnic quota indicating government’s preference for maintaining status
quo.  Nothing  significant  has  been  done  for  tackling  allegations  of  cronyism  and
nepotism. Evidence  shows that  as soon as  the government’s  initial  anti-corruption
euphoria  was  over  Malaysia’s  political  economy  regained  some  of  its  early
characteristics and dynamics (Case, 2005).  Abdullah’s period has seen the rise of his
son  Kamaluddin  (once  only  a  minor  player  in  the  business  scene)  as  one  of  the
wealthiest  business  elites  in  the  country  -  widely  believed  to  be  through  state
patronage. The police investigation into his Company over its alleged involvement in
producing components for Libya’s nuclear weapons program has swiftly cleared him
of any wrongdoing. However, Dr Wan Azizah - the leader of the Keadilan party -
notes:  ‘Abusing diplomatic  machinery and resources  to defend a private company
owned  by  the  son  of  the  Prime  Minister  is  a  clear  proof  of  how  cronyism  and
nepotism  have  been  institutionalised  …in  Malaysia’  (Wall  Street  Journal,  24
February, 2004). While such reactions from the political opposition must be treated
with caution, it is almost certain that cases like this have eroded the credibility of the
government’s anti-corruption campaigns.
Administrative reforms and innovations appear to have achieved little since
their implementation has been poor and uneven. As Malaysia has followed global
trends in public service reforms, drives like excellent work culture movement, TQM,
MS ISO 9000,  clients  charters  have waxed and waned.   Although some of  these
continue to be part of governmental drives to enhance public sector performance and
integrity,  they  do  not  seem to  command the  level  of  administrative  and  political
support they received at their launch.  The Malaysian experience shows that with the
advent of new concepts and reforms pre-existing ones are put on back burner, if not
abandoned  altogether.  Not  surprisingly,  often they exist  more in  form rather  than
substance. There is little to indicate that they are subject to any sort of regular review
and  monitoring.  Instead,  currently  much  of  the  energy  is  channelled  towards
implementation of e-government. The introduction of new mechanisms like NIP, MII,
MACC and Anti Corruption Academy has undoubtedly added to the list of institutions
designed to tackle the problem and enhance integrity; perhaps it is too early to judge
their impacts and performance as they are still at their infancy.  Much depends on the
commitment and support of the new leadership that has taken the helm of state power
recently.  It  is not clear if these institutions will muster such support from the new
Prime  Minister  Najib  Razak  who  has  taken  the  helm  amid  mounting  allegations
against him for scandals ranging from corruption in a defence deal to murder of a
Mongolian model (Asia World News, 3 April, 2009).
5. Concluding Remarks
The paper reveals that although there is an elaborate institutional framework to deal
with corruption  and the government’s  anti-corruption campaign  has  been  in  place
since 2003, the overall situation in Malaysia has been far from satisfactory. In other
words,  the  institutional  measures  and  governmental  strategies  have  failed  to  have
significant impacts on corruption in the society.  Variety of measures introduced is
clearly visible, but their effectiveness is far less evident.  This is more so with the
recent  measures  and  innovations  some  of  which  are  still  at  the  early  stage  of
implementation.  While  governmental  initiatives  made  during  past  decades  are
generally  viewed  favourably,  there  is  a  feeling  that  they  fell  short  of  what  was
required  to  make  anti-corruption  bodies  effective  and  credible  in  the  eyes  of  the
people. The paper shows that in stead of strengthening the existing institutions and
enhancing their  capacity to  act  as  effective  watchdog agencies  the government  of
Malaysia has often taken the path of establishing new institutions and strategies. The
leadership in Malaysia appears to be efficient in importing new models with all their
institutional  wrappings and jargons but  poor in  effective implementation and their
subsequent  consolidation.  The  experience  with  numerous  public  sector  reforms
confirms this. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s the public service in Malaysia has
adopted a range of measures many of which have already fallen wayside given the
current emphasis on e-government. 
The Badawi government came to power with a slogan to stamp out corruption
in the  society has  hardly made any major  departure  from the  past  in  this  regard.
Reforms and changes it introduced have remained narrowly focused; no significant
move has  been made to  either  to  rectify  the defects  of  the political  system or  to
address the weaknesses of the existing institutions for enhancing their effectiveness.
Hardly  anything  substantive  has  been  done  in  terms  of  strengthening  democratic
institutions, audit and oversight functions, freedom of media, access to information
and  the  like.  Such  failures  coupled  with  political  corruption  and  slacks  in  the
enforcement  of  laws  and  regulations  have  undermined  the  government’s  anti-
corruption drives to a large extent.  The paper shows that the current  leadership is
either unable or unwilling to tackle political corruption for the ruling UMNO itself is
enmeshed in such culture. Thus the political will to fight corruption has remained low
and half-hearted.  The paper  argues  that it  is  this weakness  which largely explains
other deficiencies including the handicaps of the existing institutions and the non-
enforcement  or  selective enforcement  of  existing laws and regulations.  One silver
lining however is the establishment of MACC.  Despite its limitations, we regard this
as  a  step  in  the  right  direction  –  although  it  remains  to  be  seen  if  the  reformed
structure can make any major difference. 
This  brings  us  to  some  important  questions:  do  institutions  matter?  What
lessons can we draw from the Malaysian experience? A key argument of the paper is
that that current  institutions and strategies in Malaysia have failed to have desired
impacts.  The paper also shows that the deteriorating corruption situation in Malaysia
is due, among others, to the defects of the country’s political systems, cultures and
institutions.  In a way this suggests that old political institutions and cultures last long
and  that  they  continue  to  shape  and  constrain  new  politics  and  reforms.  Thus
institutions are important and they do matter! However, as the paper demonstrates, the
introduction of new institutional  measures  is  not  enough;  in fact,  this is not  what
Malaysia needs urgently.  Institutions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
effective anti-corruption drives. For institutions do not work in a vacuum, they must
be  supported  with  favourable  policy  context  to  enable  them  to  play  their  roles.
Therefore,  what  is  important  is  a  comprehensive  approach  where  anti-corruption
efforts focus beyond institutional tools. A robust governance framework can bolster
the capacity and effectiveness of institutions to a large extent. Anti-corruption drives
and  institutions  are  unlikely  to  make  much  headway  if  basic  conditions  of  good
governance are absent.  There is greater  need now than any time before for  a free
media,  freedom  of  information  act  and  whistle  blower  protection  laws.  It  is  also
important that the Official Secrets Act is repealed to ensure greater transparency in
public  administration.  Certainly  Malaysia  cannot  be  a  transparent  society  if  the
transparency and disclosure of information is punishable under the law. Objectives of
combating corruption and managing integrity will remain largely illusive as long as
Malaysia’s political culture characterised by money politics, patronage networks and
fusion of roles. Since the effectiveness of anti-corruption drives is frustrated by high
level  corruption  concerted  and  robust  efforts  are  required  for  tackling  it.  Most
importantly, there is a need to change the public perception about the seriousness of
the government in fighting corruption making it a ‘high risk and low return activity’.
Without this, new institutions and laws are unlikely to bear much fruits.
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NOTES
1
 While the legal approach advocates measures like tougher sanctions against corrupt activity alongside audit and
oversight, those who support the market strategy are of the view that the most effective way to curb corruption is to
remove government control in service provision thereby allowing market forces to operate in a competitive
environment. The social approach emphasizes ethical norms, education and public vigilance. The political strategies for
eliminating corruption would require broadening of public access to decision making process, enhanced transparency
and administrative reforms, among others.
2
  The high powered committee is headed by the Chief Secretary to the government and includes the Director
General of Public Service Department, the Director General of ACA, and the Director General of MAMPU as its
members. 
3
 Necessary  legislations  have  also  been  put  in  place.  Anti  Corruption  Act,  1997,  Emergency  (Essential  Powers)
Ordinance No. 20, 1970, Penal Code, Police Act 1967, Customs Act  1967, Anti Money Laundering Act,  2001 are
among the principal legislations. Taken together, these acts provide a comprehensive legal framework within which
various agencies operate and seek to reduce and eliminate corruption in the society. 
4
 It is worth noting that these findings were consistent with those of other studies conducted earlier. A 1999 study that
used bribe payers index (BPI) and focused on 19 major exporting countries in the world, Malaysia scored only 3.9. The
study concluded Malaysia as one of the top bribe giving countries. Another study conducted by Transparency
International Malaysia in 2002 focussed on public perception and awareness of corruption in government agencies
operating in Selayang area. 60% of the respondents surveyed viewed corruption to be serious within government
agencies operating at the local level.   
 
5
 The explanations for such results must be found elsewhere. Despite the adoption of a single agency anti-corruption
watchdog the differences in their contexts must be highlighted.  Both Hong Kong and Singapore are city states while
Malaysia is a large country in terms of its size and population. Unlike Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong have
adopted broader definitions of corruption; are largely governed by corporate culture as opposed to Malaysia’s semi-
feudal norms and values. While in Malaysia ethnic considerations play important roles in appointments and promotions,
merit based civil service and market based compensation system followed in Singapore and Hong Kong have kept
nepotism and cronyism at bay.  Besides, though ICAC in Hong Kong and CPIB in Singapore operate under the chief
executives there is little indication that the political leaders impose any constraints on operations of these agencies. But
the ACA in Malaysia operated under political imperatives and required to obtain green signals from the Prime
Minister’s Department before investigating and prosecuting some individuals. 
